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Abstract
The paper uses a non-cooperative simultaneous game for coalition
structure formation (Levando, 2016) to demonstrate some applications
of the introduced game: a cooperation, a Bayesian game within a coali-
tion with intra-coalition externalities, a stochastic game, where states
are coalition structures, self-enforcement properties of non-cooperative
equilibrium and construction of a non-cooperative stability criterion.
Keywords: Noncooperative Games, Cooperation, Bayesian Games, Stochas-
tic Games,
JEL : C72, C73
1 Subject of the paper
The previous paper, Levando (2016), introduced a non-cooperative game to
study coalition structures formation as a non-cooperative game. The sug-
gested game consisted of a set of players N1, a coalition structure construc-
tion mechanism ({K,P(K),R(K)}), and individual properties of players,
∗Special thanks to Fuad Aleskerov, Shlomo Weber and Lev Gelman.
E-mail for correspondence: dlevando (at) hse.ru.
1Size of the set N will be also denoted as N , if there is no ambiguity in notation.
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(Si(K),U(K))i∈N , such that
Γ(K) =
〈
K, {K,P(K),R(K)}, (Si(K),Ui(K))i∈N
〉
,
where K is a maximum coalition size or a maximum number of deviators,
P(K) is a family of coalition structures such that any coalition size (a number
of deviators ) does not exceed K, R(K) is a family of specific coalition
structure formation rules, Si(K) is a corresponding set of strategies of i ∈ N
induced by K, Ui(K) is family of specific coalition structure payoffs for i in
every partition P ∈ P(K). Games for all relevant K make a nested family
Γ = {Γ(K = 1), . . . ,Γ(K), . . .Γ(K = N)} : Γ(K = 1) ⊂ Γ(K) ⊂ Γ(K = N).
The family of games is characterized by a list of equilibrium strategy pro-
files,
(
σ∗(1), . . . , σ∗(K), . . . , σ∗(K = N)
)
, where σ∗(K) = (σ∗i (K))i∈N . and
by a list of equilibrium partitions,
(
{P ∗}(1), . . . , {P ∗}(K), . . . , {P ∗}(K =
N)
)
, {P ∗}(K) ⊂ P(K). Every game Γ(K) from a family Γ, which has an
equilibrium may be in mixed strategies.
This paper demonstrates applications of the constructed game for: self-
interest cooperation, a Bayesian stochastic game, studying self-enforcing
properties of an equilibrium and construction of a non-cooperative criterion
of coalition structure stability.
2 Cooperation
To explain formally cooperation we will retell with necessary changes the
example from the corporate dinner game in Levando (2016). The result of
this example will be used to explain formal definition of what a cooperation
in allocations of self-interest players can be. In this section the term ”coop-
eration” means only a cooperation of players in allocations over coalitions.
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Cooperation in payoffs is not addressed here.
2.1 Cooperation in a corporate dinner game
Consider a game of 4 players: A is a President; B is a senior vice-president;
C1, C2 are two other vice-presidents. Coalition is a group of players at one
table. Every player may sit only at one table. Coalition structure is an
allocation of all players over no more than four tables. Empty tables are not
taken into account.
Individual set of strategies is a set of all coalition structures for the play-
ers. Any player can choose a coalition structure. A set of strategies in the
game is a direct (Cartesian) product of four individual strategy sets. A choice
of all players is a point in the set of strategies of the game.
Preferences are such that everyone (besides A) would like to have a dinner
with A, but A only with B. Everyone wants players outside his table to eat
individually, due to possible dissipation of rumors or information exchange.
No one can enforce others to form or not to form coalitions.
In every partition any coalition (i.e. a table with players who eat at
the table) is formed only if everybody at the table agrees to have dinner
together, otherwise the player eats alone. The same coalition belongs to
different coalitions, but with different allocations of other players over other
coalitions.
The game is simultaneous and one shot. Realization of the final partition
( a coalition structure) depends on choices of coalition structures of all play-
ers. Example. Let player A choose {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}}; player B choose
{{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}}; player C1 choose {{A,C1}, {B}, {C2}}, and player C2
choose {{A,C2}, {B}, {C2}}. Then the final partition is {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}}.
It is clear that strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1960), which is based on
a deviation of a coalition of any size, does not discriminate between coalition
structures mentioned above.
Players have preferences over coalition structures. Payoff profile of the
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game should be defined for every final coalition structure. Table 1 presents
coalition structures only with the best individual payoffs.2 Thus only some
partitions from the big set of all strategies deserve attention. The first column
is a number of a strategy. The second column is an allocation of players over
a coalition structure, i.e. a strategy, and also a list of best final coalition
structures. The third column is a payoff profile for all players of every listed
coalition structure. The fourth column is a list of coalition values in the
listed coalition structure, if to calculate values from the cooperative game
theory.
Payoffs are defined for a game of four players in such a way, that an
increase in the size of a maximum coalition from K = 2 to K = 3, 4 only de-
creases individual payoffs. Thus from one side there is ”an optimal” coalition
size, from another an increase in a maximum coalition size does not change
the equilibrium. The last property will be addressed formally in one of the
following sections of the current paper.
Table 1: Strategies and payoffs in the corporate dinner game
num Best final partitions
Non-cooperative payoff profile
(UA, UB , UC1 , UC2)
Values of coalitions as in
cooperative game theory
1 {{A,B}, {C1}, {C2}} (10,10,3,3) 20AB, 3C1 , 3C2
2∗ {{A,B}, {C1, C2}} (8,8,5,5) 16AB, 10C1,C2
3 {{A,C1}, {B,C2}} (3,5,10,5) 13AC1 , 10BC2
4 {{A,C1}, {B}, {C2}} (3,3,10,3) 13AC1, 3B, 3C2
5 {{A,C2}, {B,C1}} (3,5,5,10) 13AC2 , 10BC1
6 {{A,C2}, {B}, {C1}} (3,3,3,10) 13AC1, 3B, 3C1
7 all other partitions (1,1,1,1) ≤ 4
The game runs as follows. Players simultaneously and independently
announce choices of desirable coalition structures, then the final coalition
2All other coalition structures have significantly lower payoffs.
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structure is formed according to the rule above, and payoffs are assigned.
The rule is not formalized for a shorter exposition.
Players A and B would always like to be together, then with C1 or C2.
Being rational A and B would choose coalition structure with the highest
payoff, i.e. the strategy 1. The first best choices of C1 and C2 is to have
a dinner with A. However, A will never choose to be with either of them.
Hence, non-realization of this option makes a potential loss for both C1 and
C2.
Both players C1 and C2 are aware of this. Another common knowledge,
that they both know about each other, is that if they make a coalition of
two, each will be better off. This behavior meets sociological understanding of
cooperation - to unite in order to prevent a loss, to which each is individually
exposed to.
A cooperation between C1 and C2 does not demolish the coalition {A,B},
but only reduces payoffs for it’s members. At the same time players A and
B cannot prevent cooperation between C1 and C2 (or to insure against).
On the other hand, if players A and B choose strategy 2 they will obtain
coalition {A,B} in any case. In terms of mixed strategies this means that
an equilibrium mixed strategy for A and for B is the whole probability space
over two points, two coalition structures.
From the forth column we can see that the corresponding cooperative
game has an empty core. Strong Nash equilibrium cannot be applied here
also. Coalition value approach also supports the idea of cooperation, but
without an explicit allocation of payoffs. This means it ignores individual
rationality and incentive compatibility to participate in a coalition. For ex-
ample, how players C1 and C2 should divide the value of a joint coalition
{C1, C2} equal to 10?
The constructed game has a unique equilibrium, which in terms of indi-
vidual payoffs is characterized as the second-best efficient for every player.
There are two coalitions in the equilibrium coalition structure.
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2.2 Formal definition of cooperation
This section formalizes an idea of cooperation presented in the example
above. We demonstrate only one way for defining cooperation, when it is
intentional and complete.
Definition 1 (complete cooperation in a coalition). In a game Γ(K) with
an equilibrium σ∗(K) = (σ∗i )i∈N a set of players g, completely cooperate
in a coalition g ex ante if for every player i ∈ g there is
ex ante : for every i in g, a desirable coalition g always belongs to a chosen
coalition structure, i.e such if si is chosen by i, then si ∈ Si(Pi), g ∈
Pi, where Pi is a coalition structure chosen by i, however coalition
structures chosen by different players may be different.
ex post 1 : every realized coalition structure contains g, i.e. g ∈ ∀P ∗,
where P ∗ is a formed equilibrium partition of Γ(K),
ex post 2 EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σ∗(K)
)
≥ EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σ∗i (K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)
, for ∀σi(K) 6= σ
∗
i (K),
First of all, cooperation is defined for a game Γ(K). If a game changes due
to a change in the number of deviators K, the cooperation may evaporate.
Every player chooses a partition with the desirable coalition g with pos-
itive probability. But individually chosen coalition structures by all players
may be different.
After the game is over the coalition g always belongs to every final equilib-
rium coalition structure, disregard allocation of players over other coalitions.
A final partition may differ from a chosen one, but in any case it will contain
the desirable coalition.
The defined cooperation assumes agents are acting from self-interest mo-
tivations. The lunch game example further expands the case, where there is
imperfect cooperation.
The dinner game example has the complete cooperation for players C1
and C2. The definition does not exclude inter and intra-coalition interaction.
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If we relax some conditions of the definition we will obtain weaker conditions
for cooperation. Cooperation in repeated games is of special interest and will
be addressed in one of the next papers.
3 Bayesian games
In this section we demonstrate how intra-coalition externalities of the grand
coalition may happen from equilibrium mixed strategies. In order to show
that, a standard Battle of Sexes game is modified.
Let there be two players, Ann and Bob. Each has two options: to be
together with another or to be alone. In every option each can choose where
to go: to Box or to Opera. Hence every player has four strategies. A set
of strategies of the game leads to 16 outcomes. Every outcome consists of
payoff profile and a partition (or a coalition structure). Both players have
preferences over coalition structures: they prefer to be together, then be
separated.
The rules of coalition structure formation mechanism are:
1. If they both choose to be together, i.e. both choose the coalition struc-
ture Pjoint = {Ann,Bob} then:
(a) if both choose the same action for Pjoint (i.e. both choose Box or
both choose Opera), then they go to where they both choose to
go,
(b) otherwise they do not go anywhere, but enjoy just being together;
2. if at least one of them chooses to stay alone, i.e. chooses a parti-
tion Psepar = {{Ann}, {Bob}}, then each goes alone to where she/he
chooses, may be to different Opera or different Box performances.
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Table 2: Payoff for the Bach-or-Stravinsky game. B is for Box, O is for
Opera. If the players choose to be together, and it is realized due to the rule
of coalition structure formation, then each obtains an additional fixed payoff
ǫ > 0.
BBob,Psepar OBob,Psepar BBob,Pjoint OBob,Pjoint
BAnn,Psepar
(2; 1)∗,K=1
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(2;1)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
OAnn,Psepar
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(1; 2)∗,K=1
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(1;2)
{{1}, {2}}
BAnn,Pjoint
(2;1)
{{1}, {2}}
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(2 + ǫ; 1 + ǫ)∗,K=2
{1, 2}
(ǫ; ǫ)
{1, 2}
OAnn,Pjoint
(0;0)
{{1}, {2}}
(1;2)
{{1}, {2}}
(ǫ; ǫ)
{1, 2}
(1 + ǫ; 2 + ǫ)∗,K=2
{1, 2}
Formally the rules are:
R(K = 1): S(K = 1) 7→ S({{1}, {2}}),
∀s ∈ Si(K = 1) = {OAnn,Psepar , BAnn,Psepar} × {OBob,Psepar , BBob,Psepar}
and
R(K = 2): S(K = 2) 7→


S({1, 2}),
if s ∈ {OAnn,Psepar , BAnn,Psepar} × {OBob,Psepar , BBob,Psepar}
S(K = 2) \ S({1, 2}}), otherwise
The whole Table 2 corresponds to the game with K = 2 where the game
for K = 1 is a component. If Ann and Bob play the game with K = 1 with a
single coalition structure {{Ann}, {Bob}}, then the payoffs for this game are
in the two-by-two top-left corner of Table 2. If Ann and Bob are together,
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then each obtains an additional payoff ǫ, and the corresponding cells make a
two-by-two bottom-right corner.
Every game with K = 1 and K = 2 has only one mixed strategies equi-
librium and only one equilibrium partition. Mixed strategies equilibrium for
K = 1 is described in every textbook. A change in K from K = 1 to K = 2
results in a changes of an equilibrium strategy profile and an equilibrium
partition.
ForK = 2 the game also has a mixed strategies equilibrium like forK = 1.
The difference is that now players have an allocation in a different coalition
structure in comparison to the case of K = 1. Mixed strategies equilibrium
for Ann is: σ∗(BAnn,Pjoint) = (1+ǫ)/(3+2ǫ), σ
∗(OAnn,Pjoint) = (2+ǫ)/(3+2ǫ),
i ∈ {Ann,Bob}, what results in an equilibrium partition Pjoint, what is the
grand coalition. And there is an equilibrium intra-coalition activity.
The presented game allows to construct intra-coalition externalities from
mixed strategies within one partition. Mixed intra-coalition externalities
means that players are exposed to equilibrium fluctuations from strategic
actions of another player.
A game as above can not be constructed within any cooperative game
equilibrium concept. It is impossible to construct Shapley value (195) here
even if there is one coalition: players have equilibrium mixed strategies inside
it.
4 Stochastic games
Shapley (1953) defined stochastic games as ” the play proceeds by steps from
position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly
by the two player”. This section demonstrates how this type of games with
coalition structures as states of a game may appear in the constructed game.
The example differs from example above as a set of the equilibrium mixed
strategies induces more than one equilibrium coalition structure. We use a
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game, similar to corporate dinner game, but with identical players.
4.1 Corporate lunch game
There is a set of four identical players N = {A,B,C,D}. An individual
strategy is a coalition structure, or an allocation of all players across tables
during lunch. A coalition structure is an allocation of players over no more
than four tables, where possibly empty tables do not matter. A rule of
coalition formation is a unanimous agreement to form a coalition. If player
chooses a coalition, but other members of the coalition did not choose him,
the player eats alone.
A player has preferences over coalition structures: she/he prefers to eat
with someone and other players eat individually. If one eats alone he is hurt
by a possible formed coalition of others. Coalition structures, and payoff
profiles for the highest cases payoffs are presented in Table 3:
Table 3: Office lunch game: strategies and payoff profiles. Full set of equi-
librium mixed strategies are indicated only for player A
num Coalition structure Payoff profile UA, UB, UC , UD
Coalition values
as in
cooperative game theory
1∗ {A,B}, {C}, {D}: σ∗A = σ
∗
B = 1/3 (10,10,3,3) 20A,B, 3C , 3D
2∗ {A,C}, {B}, {D}: σ∗A = σ
∗
C = 1/3 (10,3,10,3) 20A,C, 3B, 3D
3∗ {A,D}, {C}, {B}: σ∗A = σ
∗
D = 1/3 (10,3,3,10) 20A,C , 3C , 3B
4 {A}, {B}, {C,D} (3,3,10,10) 3A, 3B, 29C,D
5 {A}, {D}, {C,B} (3,10,10,3) 3A, 3B, 29C,D
6 {A}, {C}, {B,D} (3,10,3,10) 3A, 3B, 29C,D
7 {A}, {B}, {C}, {D} (3,3,3,3) 3A, 3B, 3C , 3D
8 all other with K = 3, 4 (0,0,0,0) = 0
Payoffs in Table 3 are organized in the way that formation of a coalition
by other players deteriorates payoffs for the rest. Formation of two 2-player
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coalitions does not improve payoffs for every player. Outcomes of the game
are coalition structures or states of a stochastic game. An increase of K = 2
to K = 3, 4 does not change an equilibrium in mixed strategies, hence we
can speak about robustness of an equilibrium for K = 2 to an increase in K.
It is clear that the game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
This is a Bayesian game, with a probability distribution of equilibrium mixed
strategies. Equilibrium mixed strategies are indicated only for player A in
the first three lines of the Table 3.
4.2 A formal definition of a stochastic game of coali-
tion structure formation
Let Γ(K) be a non-cooperative game as defined above.
Definition 2. A game Γ(K) is a stochastic game if a set of equilibrium par-
titions is bigger than two, #({P ∗}(K)) ≥ 2, where a state is an equilibrium
partition P ∗ ∈ {P ∗}(K).
Studying properties of stochastic games with non-cooperative coalition
structure formation are left for future.
In the same way we can construct a family of stochastic games, what is
left for future.
5 No self-enforcement of an equilibrium and
non-cooperative criterion for stability
Aumann (1990) used ”stag and hare” game to demonstrate absence of a self-
enforcement property of Nash equilibrium. We use an extended version of
the same game to demonstrate how by modifying the game we can reach a
focal point of the game, unavailable within standard Nash equilibrium. Then
we construct a non-cooperative coalition structure stability criteria.
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There are two hunters i = 1, 2. If players can hunt only individually,
then K = 1, and the only partition is Psepar = {{1}, {2}}. An individual
strategy set of i is Si(K = 1) =
(
(Psepar, hare), (Psepar, stag)
)
. For example,
a strategy si = (Psepar, hare) is interpreted as player i chooses to hunt alone
for a hare.
A set of a corresponding strategies for the game with K = 1 is S(K =
1) = S1(K = 1)× S1(K = 1).
For a game with K = 2 every hunter can choose either to hunt alone, in
a coalition structure Psepar = {{1}, {2}}, or together, Pjoint = {1, 2}. For
every hunting partition a player chooses a target for hunting: a hare or a
stag, as in the game for K = 1. A set of strategies of i is
Si(K = 2) =
(
(Psepar, hare), (Psepar, stag), (Pjoint, hare), (Pjoint, stag)
)
,
where a strategy consists of two terms. A set of strategies of the game is a
direct ( Cartesian) product, S(K = 2) = S1(K = 2)× S2(K = 2).
We do not rewrite the rules for coalition structure formation, as they
are the same as in the BoS game above. The difference is a renaming of
strategies.
Every player knows, which game is played, either with K = 1 or with
K = 2. A case with uncertainty in parameter K is not addressed here and
left for the future.
We assume that there is a unanimous coalition formation rule, i.e. hunters
can hunt together only if both choose to be together. However even if they
both choose to hunt together, they may have a disagreement for whom to
hunt. Payoffs for the both games Γ(K = 1) and Γ(K = 2) are presented in
Table 4.
If hunters play a game with K = 1 then a maximum achievable payoff is
(8, 8), when each hunts individually for a hare. An an equilibrium strategy
profile is
(
(Psepar, hare), (Psepar, hare)
)
. In the game Γ(K = 1) the players
can not reach the efficient outcome (100, 100) of the game Γ(K = 2), when
12
both hunt for a stag together. This focal point (in terminology of Schelling)
can be reached only within the game Γ(K = 2). Thus the focal point is
feasible in the game Γ(K = 2), but not in the game Γ(K = 1).
Self-enforcing property of the equilibrium is that both players realize in-
dividual gain from a change of a game from K = 1 to K = 2 and neither can
deviate. But players can not reach the outcome (100; 100) without a change
in a game.
In literature a self-enforcement property of an equilibrium is not well-
defined, but intuitively it depends on what players think about willings of
many others to deviate from an equilibrium.
Table 4: Expanded stag and hare game
Psepar, hare Psepar, stag Pjoint,hare Pjoint, stag
Psepar,hare (8;8); {{1}, {2}} (8;0); {{1}, {2}} (8;8);{{1}, {2}} (8;0); {{1}, {2}}
Psepar, stag (0;8); {{1}, {2}} (0;0); {{1}, {2}} (0;8); {{1}, {2}} (0;0); {{1}, {2}}
Pjoint, hare (8;8); {{1}, {2}} (8;0); {{1}, {2}} (4;4); {1, 2} (8;0); {1, 2}
Pjoint, stag (0;8); {{1}, {2}} (0;0) ;{{1}, {2}} (0;8);{1, 2} (100; 100)
∗; {1, 2}
If there is an uncertainty, which game is played, either Γ(K = 1) or
Γ(K = 2), then players will randomize between two strategies: Psepar, hare
and Pjoint, stag. In this case the game becomes a stochastic game as described
above.
5.1 Criterion of coalition structure (a partition) sta-
bility
There is a nested family of games
Γ = {Γ(K = 1), . . . ,Γ(K), . . .Γ(K = N)} : Γ(K = 1) ⊂ Γ(K) ⊂ Γ(K = N).
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It is characterized by list of equilibrium strategy profiles,
(
σ∗(1), . . . , σ∗(K), . . . , σ∗(K = N)
)
,
where σ∗(K) = (σ∗i (K))i∈N and by a list of equilibrium partitions
(
{P ∗}(1), . . . , {P ∗}(K), . . . , {P ∗}(K = N)
)
,
{P ∗}(K) ⊂ P(K). Every game Γ(K) from a family Γ has an equilibrium
may be in mixed strategies.
The family of games has an equilibrium expected payoff profiles:
(
(EU
Γ(1)
i )
∗
i∈N , . . . , (EU
Γ(K)
i )
∗
i∈N , . . . , (EU
Γ(K=N)
i )
∗
i∈N
)
,
where (EU
Γ(K)
i )
∗
i∈N ≡ (EU
Γ(K)
i (σ
∗))i∈N .
Let us take a game Γ(K0) ∈ Γ with σ
∗(K0) as an equilibrium mixed
strategy set. The question is: what is a condition when an equilibrium
strategy profile does not change with an increase in a maximum coalition
size K0? We can do this by comparing expected utility for all players from
different games: Γ(K0), . . . ,Γ(K = N).
The criterion is based on the fact that a set of mixed strategies should
not change with an increase in a variety of available coalition structures. The
criterium is a sufficient criterium and defines a maximum coalition size, when
an equilibrium for smaller coalition sizes still holds true.
Definition 3. Partition stability criterion for a game Γ(K0) is a maxi-
mum coalition size K∗ when an equilibrium still holds true, i.e. for all i ∈ N
there is a maximum number K∗ such that
1.
K∗ = max
K=K0,...,N
Γ(K0)...,Γ(K=N)
{
EU
Γ(K0)
i
(
σ∗i (K0), σ
∗
−i(K0)
)
≥ EU
Γ(K)
i
(
σ∗i (K), σ
∗
−i(K)
)}
,
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2. Dom σ∗(K∗) = Dom σ∗(K0)
where σ∗(K0) is an equilibrium in the game Γ(K0), σ
∗(K) is an equilibrium
in a game Γ(K), K = K0, . . . , N , and Dom is a domain of equilibrium mixed
strategies set.
The definition is operational, it can be constructed directly from a defini-
tion of a family of games. This definition guarantees stability of both payoffs
and partition, and is a sufficient criterion of stability. Some applications may
require weaker forms of the criterion.
Now it is clear that the statement of Aumann (1990) that Nash equilib-
rium is generally not self-enforcing is correct. In the extended version of stag
and hare game we have seen that an increase in K changed an equilibrium.
The same took place in a variation of Battle of Sexes game. However this
did not happen in the Corporate Dinner or the Corporate Lunch game.
The proposed criterion may serve as a measure of trust to an equilibrium
or as a test for self-enforcing of an equilibrium. This criterion can be applied
to study opportunistic behavior in coalition partitions. If players in a coali-
tion g in a game Γ(K1) have perfect cooperation, this does not mean that in
a wider game Γ(K2), K1 < K2, they will still cooperate.
6 Discussion
The current paper demonstrates how some standard non-cooperative games
can be constructed from the game offered by Levando (2016), i.e. by in-
cluding coalition structures into consideration. The proposed detail for a
definition of a non-cooperative game improves interpretability of results and
wides applications for non-cooperative games. Using the example, the paper
offers a way to construct cooperation in coalition formation on self-interest
fundamentals. The paper offers also a non-cooperative criterion to measure
stability of coalition structures using a definition of a non-cooperated games
from a nested family.
15
The two accompanying papers demonstrate applications of the same model
to network games (a generalization of Myerson, 1977) and to simple repeated
games.
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